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Abstract. Inductive learning is analysed from the semantic point of view. Processes of forming 
generalisations of concepts determined by examples of expert decisions are discussed. It is claimed 
that since concepts are relative to background knowledge, their inductive generalisations can be 
determined only approximately. Induction t-files are defined providing a method of forming 
generalisations preserving positive and/or negative instances of concepts. 
1. Introduction 
Inductive reasoning is a research topic of long-standing interest. Recently, the 
understanding of induction is also of growing practical importance, as it holds the 
key to methods of acquisition of knowledge for knowledge based computer systems. 
The construction of knowledge bases for a given domain of applications involves 
acquisition of knowledge by induction from examples of expert decisions. The study 
and modelling of inductive reasoning is also one of the central topics of machine 
learning. The present paper has the objective of exploring some aspects of inductive 
reasoning from the semantics point of view. We consider ules of induction in a 
fixed model and we discuss how knowledge about a universe of the model influences 
a process of inductive reasoning. Moreover, we give formal counterparts of informa- 
tion about the universe and we define rules of induction in which~this information 
is explicitly taken into account. This approach is principally motivated by applica- 
tions to machine learning. 
A general scheme of induction is as follows: given background knowledge K and 
an observational statement S, a sentence H is an inductive hypothesis for S with 
respect o K iff H is a generalisation of S, and H is consistent with K. In this 
scheme it is assumed that K, S, and H are expressed in a certain formal or natural 
language. In this paper we attempt to formulate induction rules in a purely semantic 
form, and to analyse them independently of the language in which background 
knowledge, observational facts, and a hypothesis are expressed. The problem of 
which hypotheses can be accepted is substantially separable from the problem of 
how to derive their linguistic counterparts hen. 
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According to a commonly used set-theoretic approach, semantic ounterparts of
expressions of any formal language are subsets of a set admitted as a universe of 
an interpretation of the language. Hence, we assume that we are given a fixed 
domain OB, referred to as a set of objects, and instead of an observational statement 
S we consider a set of instances Xs c_ OB of a concept expressed by the statement. 
Similarly, let a subset XH of the domain be the semantic ounterpart of a hypothesis 
H. Furthermore, background knowledge is expressed by means of relationships or 
associations between elements of the domain. We assume that relations in set OB 
are formal counterparts of these associations. Here we confine ourselves to binary 
relations. For a relation R and a subset X of the domain we introduce aclassification 
of elements of the universe into positive, negative, and borderline instances of X 
with respect o R. In general, knowledge represented by R does not enable us to 
define a sharp boundary between a set and its complement. We are only able to 
give an approximate boundary. In the positive region of X lie those elements of 
the universe which, up to knowledge represented by R, belong to X. The negative 
region contains those elements which definitely do not belong to X. The borderline 
region is a doubtful area. We consider a hypothesis XH to be confirmed by Xs with 
respect o background knowledge whenever XH contains only instances of the 
concept represented by Xs. Since these instances are determined up to a relation 
reflecting background knowledge, we should consider ules of induction preserving 
positive and/or negative regions of concepts, respectively. The problem of finding 
a syntactic description of a concept verified by instances XH is not considered here. 
Considerations on formal languages for knowledge representation a d on relation- 
ships between semantic and syntactic representations of concepts, related to the 
semantic approach developed in the paper, can be found in [18, 20]. 
The approach to inductive reasoning presented in this paper was inspired by 
investigations on induction carried on both in philosophical logic and computer 
science. A sample of representative works in both of these directions is given in the 
references. The semantic model of a universe of discourse admitted here and 
approximate r presentations of concepts were inspired by the rough set theory [22]. 
2. Universe of discourse 
The schemes of inductive reasoning which will be shown in this paper cover those 
domains which can be described by the listing of the following conceptual primitives: 
object, attribute, and value of attribute. Typically, such domains are considered in 
the theories of data bases [4], information systems [21], and knowledge representa- 
tion [20]. By an object we mean anything that can be spoken of in the subject 
position of a natural language sentence, e.g., book, company. Objects can be 
compound and structured, but they are treated as single wholes. Objects are charac- 
terised by means of attributes which are meaningful for these objects, e.g., colour, 
weight. Every attribute can take on values from a fixed set of values, for instance, 
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the attribute 'colour' may assume values red, blue, green, and the value of the 
attribute 'weight" can be a real number from a certain interval. We shall hereafter 
assume that the sets of objects, attributes, and values of attributes are fixed for a 
given domain. Hence, by a universe of discourse we mean a system 
U= (OB, AT, {VAL~}~AT), 
where OB is a nonempty set of objects, AT is a nonempty set of attributes, and, for 
each attribute a ~ AT, set VALo is the set of values of a. Let VAL be the union of 
all the sets VALe. 
Given a universe U, by information about an object we mean the description of 
the object by the listing of the values of all its attributes admitted in the universe. 
A formal counterpart of information is a function f :  OB x AT~VAL such that 
f(o, a) ~ VALa for all o e OB and a e AT. 
Example 2.1. Let us assume that we are given a set OB consisting of ten persons 
o~, . . . ,  o10. The persons are characterised by attribute 'age'. We have the following 
information about the age of the given persons: 
age age 
ol 16 06 30 
02 14 07 19 
03 14 08 50 
04 18 09 70 
05 28 Olo 70 
3. Associations 
Elementary knowledge about objects from a given universe is provided by informa- 
tion about values of attributes for the objects. In terms of such information we can 
define the other useful components of knowledge. For instance, we can consider 
similarity, or indiscernibility of objects with respect o some attributes. Typically, 
such knowledge can be expressed by means of a certain condition expressed in 
terms of information about objects. Let us assume that we are given a subset A of 
set AT of attributes and we are interested in some conditions 
CR(f(o~, a),... ,f(o,, a)) for a e A and n I>2. We define a family of relations R(A) 
in set OB as follows: 
(ol,. . . ,  o,)e R(A) iff CR(f(Oh a),... ,f(o,,, a)) holds for all a~A. 
These relations will be referred to as associations between objects. They depend 
on sets of attributes treated as parameters. Associations reflect our background 
knowledge about objects. For a given universe of discourse we choose associations 
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to express our 'views' or 'points of view' which ~ve consider to be useful for exploring 
the universe. Below we list some elementary properties of associations. 
Proposition of 3.1 
(a) R(A)=Aa~A R(a). 
(b) R(Au B)=R(A)r~R(B). 
(c) R(A)uR(B)c_R(AnB). 
(d) g (o )=oa n. 
(e) A c_ B implies R(B)c_ R(A). 
Example 3.2. Let us consider the universe of discourse from Example 2.1 and the 
following binary association: (01, 02) ~ R (age) if[ the absolute value of the difference 
between the age of 01 and the age of o2 is not greater than 3. 
The following pairs of objects atisfy the above condition: (01, 02), (01, 03), (01, 04), 
(01, 07), (o2, o3), (04, 07), (o5, o6), (o9, 01o), and, moreover, all the pairs (oj, oi) for 
(oi, oj) listed above, and all the pairs (oi, oi) for i = 1 , . . . ,  10. The given association 
reflects ome knowledge about the given persons expressed in terms of their age. 
Namely, the pairs of persons satisfying the given condition can be considered to 
be of similar age. 
In the rest of this paper we confine ourselves to binary associations which are at 
least reflexive. 
4. Concepts 
Next to information about objects which is treated as an elementary component 
of knowledge, we consider more complex elements of knowledge, namely concepts. 
In its semantic interpretation, a concept is represented, in accordance with the 
commonly used set-theoretic approach, as a subset of a universe of discourse. Given 
a concept, the problem arises to characterise this concept taking into account 
background knowledge represented by the associations admitted for the given uni- 
verse. It is usually the case that concepts cannot be uniquely defined in terms of 
the associations, but they can be defined with some tolerance. We adopt the idea 
developed by Pawlak [22] to associate with a set a pair of sets determining the 
limits of this tolerance. 
Given a binary association R(A), and an object o e OB, we define sets sucmA)(o) 
and premA)(o ) of successors and predecessors of o with respect to R(A), respectively 
as follows: 
SUCR(A)(O) = {O'e OB: (o, o') e R(A)}, 
preR(A)(O) = {O'E  OB: (o', o) ~ R(A)}. 
Next, we consider what is called a neighbourhood of object o with respect to R(A): 
rlR(A)( O ) ----" SUCR(A)( O ) U preR(A)(o). 
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Given a set X c OB considered as a semantical representation f a certain concept, 
we define a lower approximation R(A)X and an upper approximation R(--~X of 
X with respect o R(A) as follows: 
- R(A)X is the union of those sets nRtA)(O) which are included in set X, 
- R(A--~X is the union of those sets nR~A)(o) which have an element in common 
with set X. 
Approximations of sets with respect o equivalence relations were considered in 
[22], and for similarity relations in [31]. Intuitively, the lower approximation of a 
set X consists of those objects which definitely, according to knowledge represented 
by R(A), belong to X. Similarly, the upper approximation of a set X consists of 
those objects which possibly, according to knowledgeR(A) belong to X. Below we 
list some basic properties of approximations. 
Proposition 4.1 
(a) R(A)~ R(B) implies R(B)Xc_ R(A)X and R---(-~X~R---(~X for any set 
X_OB. 
(b) X c y implies R(A)X c R(A) Y and R(-~X c_ R(A) Y. 
Proposition 4.2 
(a) R(A)XuR(B)Xc_R(AuB)X .  
(b) R(AnB)X~_R(A)nR(B)X .  
(c) R(Au B)X~R(A)Xc~R(B)X.  
(d) R- -~Xu R( -~Xc_R(AnB)X.  
Proposition 4.3 
(a) R(A)OB=OB, R(A)0=0. 
(b) R(A)X ~ X. 
(c) R(A) R(A)X= R(A)X. 
(d) R(A)XuR(A)Yc_R(A) (Xu  Y). 
(e) R(A)(Xc~ Y)c_R(A)XnR(A)Y .  
Proposition 4.4 
(a) R(A)OB=OB,  R(A-))0=0. 
(b) X c_ R(A)X. 
(c) R(A)X ~ R--'("~ R--'('~X. 
(d) R(-~ (X u Y)= R---(-~X u R(A) Y. 
(e) R(A)(X n Y)~_R---('~X nR-R--(-~Y. 
Proposition 4.5 
(a) R(A) R(A)X= X. 
(c) nR(A)(-X). 
(d) R(A)X=-R---(-~(-X)u R(A)X c~R---(-~(-X). 
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Relativisation of Concepts to background knowledge represented by a family of 
relations R(A) leads to a classification of elements of the universe into positive, 
negative, and borderline instances of concepts. We say that object o is an R(A)- 
positive (negative, borderline) instance of X iff o~R(A)X (o~-R---(-~X,o~ 
R(A)X-R(A)X) .  It follows that if object o is an R(A)-positive instance of X, 
then knowledge provided by R(A) enables us to state that o definitely belongs to 
X. For negative instances of X we know that they definitely do not belong to X. 
Borderline instances of X represent a doubtful region; they possibly belong to X 
but we cannot decide it for certain in virtue of knowledge given by R(A). The set 
of all the R(A)-positive (negative, borderline) instances of a set X will be denoted 
by pos~(A)X (negR(A)X, bOrR(A)X). 
Proposition 4.6 
(a) pOSR<A)X U negRtA)X U borR<A)X = OB. 
(b) pOSR(A)X t'3 negR(A)X = 0. 
(c) posR(A)X ~ borR(A)X = 0. 
(d) negmA)X n borR(A)X = 0. 
Example 4.7. Let us consider the universe of discourse from Example 2.1 and relation 
R(age) from Example 3.2. For the sake of simplicity we shall drop the name of the 
attribute in this relation. The neigbourhoods of the elements of the given universe 
are as follows: 
HR(O1)-'~{01, 02, 03, 04, 07}, 
nR(o~) = n~(os)  = {o .  o~, od ,  
IIR(04) = ~lR(07)-" {01, 04, 07}, 
nR(05) = nr(06) = {05, 06}, 
nR(08) = Cod, 
lIR(09) "- /~R(010) = {09, 010}. 
Let us consider set X = {01, o2, 03, 05} representing concept 'young'. Approximations 
of set X with i'espect o relation R are as follows: 
RX = {ol, 02, 03}, 
Moreover, we have 
posRX = {ol ,  02, o3}, 
~" = {O1, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, O7}- 
negRX = Cos, 09, 010}, borRX = {0,, 05, 06, 07}. 
Hence, in accordance with knowledge about objects from the given universe we can 
consider persons 01, 02, and 03 to be definitely young, and persons os, 09, and 010 
to be definitely not young. Persons 04, 05, o6, and 07 are in the borderline region of 
concept 'young'. 
Example 4.8. For the universe and the association as above let us consider set 
X = {03, 05, 06, Os, 09, 010}. We have 
posaX = RX = {05, 06, Os, O9, O10}, 
negRX = _R( -X) -R( -X)c~/~X = {01, o4, 07}.-{01} = Co4, o7}, 
borRX = {01, o2, 03}. 
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Let us observe that the intersection of sets R( -X)  and ~ is not empty. It follows 
that the borderline instances of X may be at the same time positive instances of 
-X.  This is the consequence of the fact that knowledge restricted to association R
does not enable us to establish a sharp boundary between set X and its complement. 
5. Induction from examples 
In this section we shall attempt o define operations of inductive inference of 
concepts from sets of examples. Background knowledge about objects from a given 
universe nables us to characterise objects only approximately. It follows that we 
cannot recognise instances of concepts in a definite way, but we are able to establish 
positive, negative, and borderline regions of concepts only. In such cases it seems 
reasonable to consider two kinds of rules of inductive generalisation, amely rules 
referring to positive and negative regions of concepts, respectively. 
Given a universe of discourse (OB, AT, VAL), and a family {R(A)},~=_AT ofbinary 
associations representing background knowlege about objects of the universe, we 
define operations of bottom inductive implication and top inductive implication 
with respect to a relation R(A). Given a set X of examples of instances of a certain 
concept, we say that set Z is bottom inductively implied by X with respect o 
relation R(A) (X impa(A) Z) iff the following condition holds: 
X impR(A) Z iff X_  Z and R(A)X = R(A)Z. 
Hence, the bottom inductive implications preserve positive regions of concepts. 
Similarly, a top inductive implication is defined as follows: 
X impR(A) Z iff X _c Z and R----~X = R---~Z. 
It follows from this definition that the top inductive implications preserve negative 
regions of concepts. Observe that according to a bottom inductive implication we 
may add to a set some elements belonging to its negative region, not violating its 
positive region. A top inductive implication allows us to add an element to a set of 
examples whenever it is associated, with respect to R(A), with at least one element 
from the set of examples. The given rules provide a method of inductive reasoning 
taking into account relativeness or incompleteness of information about elements 
of the universe of discourse. Moreover, we explicitly express dependence of results 
of inductive generalisation  background knowledge which is responsible for this 
incompleteness. 
We can define a mixed induction rule preserving both positive and negative 
regions of concepts: 
X imps(A) Z iff X im___PPR(A) Z and X impR(A) Z. 
Example 5.1. Let us consider the set X = {ol, o2, o3, o5} of examples of concept 
'young' from Example 4.7. The bottom inductive consequences of X are listed below: 
Z 1 ~-- X L.) {04} , Z 2 = X t,.) {O7} , Z 3 "" X L.) {09} , Z 4 ~--- X t,.) {010 ).  
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Hence, we can add to set X one of the objects o4, 07, 09, or 010' not violating the 
positive region of concept 'young'. However, sets Z3 and Z4 do not have the same 
negative region as set X. The top inductive consequences of X are as follows: 
Zl  : X k.) { 04} , Z2 = X k.) { 06}, Z3 -~- X k.) { 07} ,
Z 4 = X k..J {04,  06} , Z 5 -~- X k...) {04,  07} , Z 6 = X k...) {06,  07} ,
Z 7 = X k..) { 04, 06, 07}. 
In these eases a process of generalisation preserves the negative region of 'young' 
determined by X but not necessarily the positive region, e.g., for Z5 we have 
RZ5 = _RX u {o,, 07}. 
6. Induction from examples and counterexamples 
In some applications we are given both a set of examples and a set of counter- 
examples of a concept. In such cases we should extend both sets according to the 
rules defined in Section 5, and, moreover, to satisfy a consistency condition. Intui- 
tively, set of examples hould be extended to positive instances of the concept, and 
set of counterexamples to its negative instances. Hence, we can accept he generalisa- 
tions only if the lower approximation of the extension of the set of examples has 
no elements in common with the upper approximation ofthe set of counterexamples. 
Given a set X of examples and a set Y of counterexamples, a pair (Z, T) of sets 
is the bottom inductive consequence ofthe pair (X, Y) iff X impmA) Z, Y impR<a) T, 
and R(A)Z  c~ R---(-~T = O. Similarly, we can define a top inductive implication from 
examples and counterexamples. 
Example 6.1. Let us consider the universe of discourse from Example 2.1 and relation 
R from Example 3.2. Assume that we are given sets X = {01, 03, 04, 07} and Y= 
{02, 08}. We have _RX = {01, o4, o7} and RY = {01, o2, 03, 04, o7, 08}. Since the intersec- 
tion ~ n/~Y is nonempty, sets X and Y are not the admissible xamples and 
counterexamples for the inductive generalisation with respect o relation R. 
Example 6.2. Let X = {01, 02, 03, 05} be the set of examples and Y = {06, 08, 09} be 
the set of eounterexamples. We have _RX = {01, 02, 03} and/~Y = {o5, o6, 08, o9, 010} 
and hence the given sets are admissible for inductive generalisation. Let us consider 
the top inductive implication. We have shown in Example 5.1 that set X can be 
extended by adding all the possible combinations of objects 04, o6, and o7. Set Y 
can be extended to sets 7"1 = Yu  {o5}, 72 = YU {O10} or T3 = Yu  {05, 010}. The upper 
approximation of all these sets equals {05, 06, 08, o9, 010}. But we have _RZ5 = 
{O1, 02, O3, 04, 05, 07} and RZ7 = {01, o2, 03, o4, 05, 06, 07}. Hence, the top inductive 
consequences of the pair (X, Y) are the pairs of sets (Zs Tj) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 
j=1 ,2 ,3 .  
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